We present a real one-time-pad key communication protocol that allows the secure direct communication. With the quantum nonlocality, Alice and Bob (the communicators) can send message to each other in a deterministic manner by using local operations and a reliable public channel. The security of this protocol is based on the 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. Actually, the eavesdropper-Eve can use a denial-of-service attack to destroy a quantum communication. In a realistic communication protocol, one has to face such question that Eve destroys the travel qubit to stop the communication. In this protocol, Alice and Bob only use local operations and public channel to communicate with each other in a deterministic manner when the entanglement was successfully shared. In principle, this protocol can protect the communication against the destroying-travelqubit-type attack with the quantum nonlocality, which allows our protocol to be practical. And we discuss its practicality with the current technologies. [8], a ping-pong protocol has been presented which allows secure QKD and quasisecure direct communication. However, when one secret bit message is transferred in these protocols [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , at least one travel qubit is needed. When the eavesdropper-Eve want to destroy the communication, she can destroy the travel photon to stop the communication, which we call destroying-travel-qubit-type (DTQT) attack.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is provably secure, by which private bit can be created between two parties over a public channel. Based on the postulate of quantum measurement [1] and no-cloning theorem [2] , different QKD protocols are presented [3] [4] [5] [6] . Recently, A. Beige et al. have presented a quantum communication protocol [7] which allows secure direct communication. In Ref. [8] , a ping-pong protocol has been presented which allows secure QKD and quasisecure direct communication. However, when one secret bit message is transferred in these protocols [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , at least one travel qubit is needed. When the eavesdropper-Eve want to destroy the communication, she can destroy the travel photon to stop the communication, which we call destroying-travel-qubit-type (DTQT) attack.
In this paper, we introduce a protocol which allows the secure direct communication using quantum nonlocality. With shared Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs, Alice and Bob (the communicators) can communicate with each other secretly by using local operations and public channel. Once the EPR pairs were successfully shared, Eve can not destroy the communication with a DTQT attack. This paper is organized as follow. We will introduce the protocol together with security proof first. And it will be discussed that this protocol can protect the communication against the DTQT attack only with a few variant. The practical feasibility and the practicality of this protocol will be shown at the end of this paper.
Communication protocol. Quantum entanglement is uniquely quantum mechanical resource that plays a key role in many of the most interesting applications of quantum computation and quantum information. We know that two qubits can be entangled in one of the Bell states
where |0 > and |1 > are up and down eigenstate of the σ z , and
Suppose Alice and Bob share the two entangled qubits which are in the state |ψ − >. It is well known that this single state can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval, but these correlations cannot be used for superluminal communication [9] . Alice sends one qubit, say B, to Bob and keeps another. If Bob performs a local measurement on in the basis B Z = {|0 >, |1 >}, then the single state will collapse immediately to a product state and the entanglement does not exist any longer. Alice also performs a local measurement in the basis B z . If Bob's measurement outcome is |0 > (|1 >), then she knows that Alice's measurement outcome is |1 > (|0 >). But what outcome Bob obtains is random with a probability p = 0.5,
So Bob can gain nothing about Alice's information only with a local measurement. To successfully transmit message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is required. After Bob received the travel qubit, he performs a measurement on it in the basis B z . Then Bob sends a signal to Alice through public channel (This can be called as Bob ′ s receipt). When Alice receives Bob's receipt, she also performs a measurement on the qubit she keeps in the basis B z . Assume Alice's measurement outcome is |0 >, i.e. she knows that Bob's measurement outcome is |1 >. When she want to sends a logical '0' to Bob, she 'say no' to Bob through public channel. Else, Alice 'say yes' to Bob to encode a logical '1'. If Alice's measurement is |1 >, she can also encode the logical '0' and '1' using the method described above. As the same as the ping-pong protocol, there are two modes, 'message mode' and 'control mode' here. By default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and communicate the way described above. With probability c, Bob switches to control mode. Control mode. After received the travel qubit, Bob performs a measurement randomly in the basis B z or B x = {|+ >, |− >}. Using public channel, he sends the result to Alice. Then Alice also switches to control mode. She performs a measurement in the same basis as Bob used. Then Alice compares both of the results. If both results coincide, Alice knows that there is an Eavesdropper-Eve in line and stops the communication. Else, this communication continues. This protocol can be described explicitly like this:
(1) Alice prepares two qubits in the Bell state |ψ − >.
(2) Alice sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another.
(3) Bob receives the travel qubit. With probability c, he switches to the control mode (4c). Else, she performs message mode (4m).
(4c) Bob performs a measurement on his qubit randomly in the basis B x or B z and tells the result to Alice through public channel. Alice then performs a measurement in the same basis Bob used. If she finds both results coincide, then she stops the communication. Else this communication continues.
(4m) Bob performs a measurement in the basis B z . Then he sends his receipt to Alice through public channel. Alice also performs a measurement in the basis B z . When Alice want to transmit a logical '0' to Bob, if her measurement outcome is |1 >, she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel. Else, she 'say no' to Bob. When Alice want to transmit a logical '1' to Bob, she 'say yes' to Bob with her measurement outcome |0 >. Else she 'say no' to Bob with her measurement outcome |1 >.
(5) When all of Alice's information is transmitted, this communication is successfully terminated.
Security proof . From Eq.(1)-Eq.(4), we know that when Alice and Bob share the state |φ + >, both of Alice's and Bob's results will coincide no matter which basis they use in control mode. When Alice and Bob share the state |φ − >, their measurement outcome will coincide when they use the measurement basis B z . Alice and Bob will obtain the same outcome with the measurement basis B x when they share the state |ψ + >. If and only if they share the state |ψ − >, their measurement outcome will never coincide. Since Bob selects the measurement basis randomly in control mode, the detection probability is at least d ≥ 0.5 when the state they shared is one of {|φ ± >, |ψ − >}. In order to be practical and secure, a QKD scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics [10] . In this protocol, Eve's aim is to find out what Bob's measurement outcome is. Eve has no access to Alice's qubit. All that she can do is to attack Bob's qubit in the quantum channel. For Eve, the qubit Alice sends to Bob is in a complete mixed state which is completely indistinguishable without measurement. Eve can use all technique allowed by quantum laws to attack the travel qubit. The most general attack operation ε can be described as a completely positive map [11] . It is possible to find out an ancilla, E, initially in a pure state |e >< e| uncorrelated with the system, and a unitary U ,
After Eve's attack, the fidelity [12] of the states |ψ − > and ρ ′ is
Let us assume that
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Because of the completeness of the Bell's states, it has that the detection probability d is approximately dependent on the quantity γ, d ≥ γ/2. Let us consider that information Eve can gain when the fidelity of the state |ψ − > and ρ ′ is √ 1 − γ. 'High fidelity implies low entropy' [13] . The mutual information S(ρ ′ E ) Eve can gain from ρ ′ is bounded by Holevo quantity, χ(ρ ′ ) [11] . From
we know that S(ρ ′ ) is the upper bound of the information Eve can gain from ρ ′ . Nevertheless, the entropy of ρ ′ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with diagonal entries 1 − γ,
Then the quantity S(ρ max ) is the upper bound of the information S(ρ ′ E ) Eve can gain under the attack operation ε,
Let us consider the relation between the fidelity F (|ψ − >, ρ ′ ) and the detection probability d. When γ = 0, i.e., S(ρ max ) = 0, information Eve can gain is zero. The detection probability d is also zero in this condition. If Eve want to gain some of Alice's information, it has S(ρ max ) ≥ S(ρ ′ E ) > 0. When δS(ρ max ) = 0, it has S(ρ max ) = 2, γ = 3 4 . Since the von Neumann entropy S(ρ max ) is a continuous function of γ, any information Eve gain will make her face a nonzero risk to be detected. The more information Eve wants to gain, the bigger risk Eve has face. One bit information obtained from ρ ′ will make him face a risk to be detected, approximately d ≥ γ 2 ≈ 9.5%. The information I 0 (d) Eve can gain in every message run is approximately dependent on the detection probability d(I 0 ). The probability of Eve's eavesdropping one bit message transfer without being detected is [8] 
where d is the detection probability in control mode. After n protocol run, the probability to successfully eavesdrop I = nI 0 becomes
For c > 0, d > 0, this value decreases exponentially. It is quasisecure to use this protocol as the direct communication but is strictly secure as a QKD protocol. In this protocol, the control parameter c is determined by the communicators. Message is transmitted in a deterministic way. When the entanglement pairs were successfully shared, Alice and Bob can communicate with each other freely because they are equivalent comparing with ping-pong protocol [8] which only permits message transfer from Alice to Bob.
Destroying − travel − qubit − type attack. The basic of secure communication is that a message can be transmitted successfully. And the security must be ensured. The basic idea behind quantum communication [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] is that Eve can not gain any information from the qubits transmitted from Alice to Bob without disturbing their state. However, Eve can destroy a quantum communication using a denial-of-service (DoS) attack [14, 15] in practice. Thus, the communication has to be stopped. Alice can not successfully complete the message transfer in the available time. As a realistic communication protocol, such question has to be faced.
In BB84 protocol, Alice uses (4n+δ) photons to transmit n classical bits. If Eve want to destroy the communication, she can destroy every travel photon. In the ping-pong protocol [8] , Eve can destroy the travel qubit either in the line B → A or in the A → B. Such question also exists in the Ekert91 [4] security of which is based on the Bell's theorem. Essentially, when Alice has to send a qubit to transmit a classical message, Eve can destroy the communication by destroying the travel qubit.
However, in our protocol, Alice and Bob communicate with each other only by using local operations and public channel after the entanglement has been successfully shared. If Eve has no access to both of Alice's and Bob's qubits, she cannot interrupt the communication. In this case, Alice and Bob communicate only by using the message of our protocol, which means the control parameter c = 0. In principle, communicators can obtain the shared entanglement in many different ways; for example, Alice could prepare the EPR pairs and then send half of each to Bob in their free time because Alice and Bob communicate in the deterministic manner. Alternatively, a third party could prepare the EPR pairs and send halves to Alice and Bob beforehand. Or they could have met a long time ago and shared them, storing them until the present. When Alice and Bob want to communicate with each other, they can use the shared EPR pairs. In this case, there is only message mode in this protocol. Every EPR pair can securely transmit one classical message, which is a real one time pad key scheme. In this way, Alice and Bob can communicate securely and directly. Eve has no chance to destroy their communication if the public channel is reliable. Therefore, our protocol can protect the communication against the DTQT attack.
P ractical f easibility. Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for first time by Bennett et al. [16] . Today, several groups have shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory [17] . In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement quantum cryptography. In practice, photons are the optimal systems for entanglement distribution because they propagate fast and can preserve their coherence over long distances [18] . Recently, given impure EPR pairs shared between two distant communicators, physical scientists can apply local operations and classical communication to distill a smaller number of higher fidelity EPR pairs in a procedure known as entanglement purification [19, 20] .
In the proposal for long-distance quantum communication [21] , entanglement between atomic ensembles is established by the detection of a single photon that could have been emitted by either ensemble. In Ref. [22] , Simon and Irvine proposed a scheme where distance trapped ions are entangled by the joint detection of two photons, one coming from each ion. Actually, only by using a beam splitter and two photon detectors, two ions can be probabilistically prepared in the state |ψ − > [23] . And the entangled ions can be stored perfectly in each ion trap comparing with the photon storage. The entanglement time can be prolonged with the long-lifetime of excited state of ion [24] . Comparing with today's technologies, our protocol can be realized not only in principle but also in practice.
Discussion and Summary. This protocol, with our knowledge, is the first realistic protocol that directly faces the DTQT attack. In fact, this protocol is a variant of the Ekert91 [4] QKD protocol. It also have been mentioned in a two-step quantum direct communication protocol [25] that Alice and Bob can establish a common one-time-pad key. It could also be considered a variant of the ping-pong protocol [8] , obtained by replacing Bob's final measurement by two measurements performed by Alice and Bob on their respective qubits, followed by classical communication. The important distinction between these protocols [4, 8, 24] and our protocol is that we clearly point out our protocol can protect the communication against DTQT attack. Importantly, a practical communication has to be considered the DTQT attack.
In summary, we propose a secure direct quantum communication protocol which allow two partners to communicate with each other coequally. In principle, this protocol can protect the communication against the DTQT attack. And we also show the practical feasibility of this protocol with current technologies.
